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incoml', alimony payable under a divllt·cc dl'l'rce may not bt,
I!onsi<if'red in determining the ability of recipient wife to
support her mother, or as income for that purpose.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer,
J., and Spence, J., concurred.

[8. P. No. 19011. In Bank.

Oct. 22, 1954.]

THOMAS H. KENNALEY, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR
COURT OF SAN MATEO COUNTY, Respondent;
FRANK D. HILL, Real Party in Interest.
[1) Prohibition-Adequacy of Other Remedies.-Writ of prohibi.
tion may issue if there is no other adequate remedy and lower
court is proceeding in excess of ita jurisdiction. (Code Civ.
Proe., §§ 1102, 1103.)
[2] Id.-Adequacl of Other Remedies.-Petitioner seeking to reo
strain court from further proceeding on cross·complaint for
slander does not have adequate remedy if court is required
under Code Civ. Proo., § 830, to compel filing of undertaking
or dismiss the cross·action.
[3] Appeal-DeciBions Appealable.-Order denying motion to dis·
miss cross-complaint is not appealable. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§963.)
[t) Prohibition-Adequacy of Other RemedieL-If petitioner seek·
ing to restrain court from further proceeding on cross·com·
plaint for slander were forced to trial without security
required by Code Civ. Proo., § 830, and bad to await relief on
appeal from final judgment, such relief would be inadequate
because he would not have benefit of security "in the progress
of the action," and pUYpose of code section would be defeated
[6] IcL-Grounds for Belief-Excess of Jurisdiction.-A court acts
in excess of ita jurisdiction, as that term is used in determining
whether writ of prohibition will issue, if it acta in violation
of a statute defining its powers.
[6] Id.-Application of Bules-Slander Oases.-ProhibitioD will lie
where plaintiff in slander action, after timely objection, fails
to file required undertaking. (Code Civ. Proc., § 830.)

[5J See Oal.Jur., Prohibition, § 4; Am.Jar. Prohibition § 19.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4] Prohibition, § 11; [3] Appeal
lIud Error, § 38; [5] Prohibition, § 16(1); (6} Prohihition. § 40;
17.10, 12J Libel and Slander, § 38; [11] Pleading § 67; [13] Setoff
and Counterclaim, § 42(3).

)

)
Oct. 1954]

KENNALEY tI.

-------

SUPERIOR COURT'

51:i

f43C.2d 512: 275 P.2d 11

17) Libel and SI~ndcr·Actions· Undr.l·taking for Costs. f"ili,,:!
of undl'rtllking- in Ildioll r'lI' ,;Inndr,' is 11111 1I ...•.. :O;~:Jry ttl vm.t
juisdi('tion in f'onrt in lir!<t in:o;hlllc(' IInf) ,h,r"n,11Inl I'nn wnive

undertaking.
[8] Id,-Actions-Undertaking for Costs.-Code eiv. Proc., ~~ 830,
832, rl'lnting to undertaking for costs in action for lihel or
sland!!r, speak of such undertaking in connection with snmmons, and under plain language of § 830, filing of undertaking
is made. a condition to the issuing of summons.
[9] Id.-Actions-Undertaking forCosts.-Filing ot· undertaking
for costs is not a condition to issuing of sumlOons on crosscomplaint for slander, since no summons issues on a cross-colU·
plaint unless new parties are brought in. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§442.)
[10] Id.-Actions-Undertaking for Costs.-Under last sentence
of Code Civ. Proc., § 830, declaring that libel or slander "actioD
brought without filing the required undertaking shall be dismissed," word "action" does not include cross-complaint since
sentence expressly refers to action without filing "required"
undertaking, which is undertaking required as condition to
issuing summons.
[11] Pleading-Cross-complaint_-Cross-complaints are tiled only
after defendant has been brought into conrt by filing of COIOplaint against him.
[12] Libel and Slander - Actions - Undertaking for Costs.-A
counterclaim to prevent barring of later action under Code
Civ. Proc., § 439, would not come within purpose of Code eiv.
Proc., § 830, requiring undertaking as condition to issuin~
summons in action for libel or slander.
(13] Setoff and Counterclaim - Pleading.-It is only when defendant's claim against plaintiff must necessarily be pleaded
as cross-complaint rather than as counterclaim that failure to
assert it does not bar a later action.

PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior
Court of San Mateo County from proceeding with trial of •
cross-action. Writ denied.
Sidney L. Berlin and Byron J. Snow for Petitioner.
No appparance for Respondent_
Hancock, Elkiugton & Rothert and Frank V. Kington for
Respondent anll RpRl Party in Interest.
[11] S('e Cal.Jur., Pleading, § 44; Am.Jur., Pleading, § 256 et seq.
t3 C.Jd-n
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THA YNOH, .T.--PctitiOllcr KCllnnll'y brought an action f01
daml'lg<'s agllim;t r·'ran1, n. Hill for IlSS:lult an(l battery, false
arrest, and malicious prosecution. Hill filed an answer and
a cross.compll'lint alleging a cause of action for slander, which
occurred as part of the transaction set forth in the complaint
as the foundation of petitioner's claim. Petitioner then filed
a notice of motion to dismiss the cross-complaint on the ground
that no undertaking had been filed by the cross·complainant
as required by section 830 of the Code of Civil Procedure.·
'rhe motion was denied, and petitioner applies for a writ of
prohibition.
[1] The writ of prohibition may issue, if there is no other
adequate remedy and the lower court is proceeding in excess
of its jurisdiction. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1102, 1103; Housing
Authority v. Superior Court, 35 Ca1.2d 550, 556 [219 P.2d
457) .)
[2] Petitioner does not have another adequate remedy,
if the court is required under section 830 to compel the filing
of the undertaking or dismiss the cross-complaint. [3] The
order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss was not appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 963.) Although it could be reviewed
on an appeal from a final judgment, that relief would be inade.
quate. [4] If petitioner were forced to trial without the
required security and had to await relief on an appeal from
the final judgment, he would not have the benefit of the
security "in the progress of the action," and the purpose of
the statute would be defeated.
We thereforc reach the question whether the court is pro·
eeeding in excess of its jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss
the cross·complaint upon the cross·complainant's failure to
file an undertaking pursuant to section 830.
[5] A court
acts in excess of its jurisdiction, as that term is used in deter·
mining whether the writ of prohibition will issue, if it acts
in violation of a statute defining its powers. (Abelleira v.
District Court of Appeal, 17 Ca1.2d. 280, 291, 303 [109 P.2d
942. 132 A.L.R. 715].)
[6] Section 830 provides that an
... Before issuing the summons in an action for libel or slander, the
('!erk shall require a written undertaking on the part of the plaintiff in
tlte sum of five hundred dollars ($:iOO), with at least two competent and
",ffident suretie~, specifying their occupations and residences, to the
pffcc.t that if the action is dismissed or the defendant recovers judgment.
they will pay the costs and charges Rwarded against the plaintiff by
judg-mpnt. in the progrps~ of the action, or on an appeal, not exceeding
tl,P '11111 f'l·(·(·ificd.
An nrtion urought without filing the required under·
~Jillli shall be cl.Wnissed.'·
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I1etion for slander "shall be dismissed," if au Utldt'l·takill~ is
not filed, and it is clear that prohibition will lie in CHS(>S where
the plainNff in a slander action, after timely objedioll, fails
to tilt' the required undertaking. (Shell Oil 00. v. Superior
Oourt, 2 Cal.App.2d 348, 352 et seq. [37 P.2d 1078]; see
.4belleira v. District Oourt of Appeal, supra, 17 Ca1.2d 288,
289.) [7] Although the filing of an undertaking is not
necessary to vest jurisdiction in the first instance, and the defendant can waive the undertaking (Shell Oil 00. v. Superior
Oourt, supra, 2 Cal.App.2d 348, 353-354; cf. Bried v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.2d 351, 354 [79 P.2d 1091]), no question
of waiver is involved here, for the motion to dismiss was
filt'd the day after the filing of the cross-complaint. We must
therefore determine whether section 830 applies to a crosscomplaint for slander as it does to a complaint alleging such a
caust' of action.
[8] The undertaking provided for in section 830 must
be filed "Before issuing the S1tmmon. in an action for libel
or slander." (Italics added.) Section 832 provides "Within
10 days after the service of summons, any defendant may
give to the plaintiff or his attorney notice that he excepts to
the sureties.•.. " (Italics added.) Thus both sections speak
of the undertaking in connection with the summons, and
under the plain language of section 830, the filing of the
undertaking is made a condition to the issuing of the summons. [9] No such condition applies to a cross-complainant,
for no summons issues on a cross-complaint unless new
parties are brought in. (Code Civ. Proc., § 442.)
[10] Petitioner stresses the last sentence of section 830,
"An action brought without filing the required undertaking
shall be dismissed," and, relying on section 22 of the Code of
Civil Procedure· and McKean v. German-American Sav.
Bank, 118 Cal. 334, 341 [50 P. 656], contends that the word
"action" therein includes a cross-complaint. The sentence in
section 830 on which petitioner relies, however, must be read
with the rest of the section. The sentence expressly refers to
an action brought without filing the "required" undertaking,
which is the undertaking required as a condition to issuing
the summons. Since issuing summons is not required on a
e" An action is an ordinary proceeding in a court ot justice by which
one party prosc('utes another for the declaration, enforecment, or protection of a right. the redrese or prevention of a wrong, or the punish·
ment of a public offense."

!
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cross-complaint such as we have here, the undertaking is not
required.
Petitioner cOlltellds that the purpose of section 830 is to
prevent the indiscriminate filing of defamation actions in bad
faith to embarrass a defendant (Smith v. McDermott, 93
Cal. 421 129 P 341) and that cross-complaints are included
within that purpose. [11] Cross-complaints, however. are
filed only after a defendant has been brought into court by
the filing of a complaint against him. [12] Furthermore,
petitioner's argument would apply to counterclaims, yet a defendant having a legitimate cause of action for defamation
may be forced to counterclaim to prevent the barring of a
later action under section 439 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
and such a counterclaim clearly would not come within the
purpose of section 830. [13] Many claims can be pleaded
as either cross-complaints or counterclaims and "It is only
when the defendant's claim must necessarily be pleaded as
a cross-complaint that 'the failure to assert it does not bar a
later action.''' (Schrader v. Neville, 34 Ca1.2d 112, 115 [207
P.2d 10571.) Hill's claim does not appear to be one that
must necessarily be pleaded as a cross-complaint, but even if
it were the undertaking would not be required. Had the
Legislature intended the section to apply to either crosscomplaints or counterclaims, it would have used language
appropriate to that end. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1858.)
Keller Research Corp. v. Roquerre, 99 F.Supp. 964, on whirh
petitioner relies, is not controlling here. The federal court
there assumed, without discussing the provisions of section
830. that the section applies to a cross-complainant. Section
830 does not admit of that assumption,
The alternative writ is discharged, and the peremptory
writ is denied.
Gibson, C. d., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J .. Carter, J., l:)chauer.
J., and Spence, J., concurred.

